In local public transport, a tiered penalty structure proves to be an effective incentive for prompt payment. This analysis is based on a sample of public transport operators built from data collected by Holacheck during fare inspection activities in 2025. The results show that more than 70% of payments are made within the first five days, while voluntary payments after sixty days are virtually non-existent. A comparison across operators highlights that an early increase in the amount of the fine encourages recipients to pay sooner, reducing procrastination and unpaid fines. More than the amount of the fine itself, it is the design of the penalty tiers that determines the effectiveness of the collection system.
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In local public transport, the penalty for travelling without a valid ticket does not have a fixed cost: its amount increases over time. During the first few days, the fine is reduced; within sixty days, it rises to the standard amount; beyond that threshold, additional surcharges apply, potentially tripling the amount due. This tiered structure is well known, yet its actual impact on payment behaviour is rarely measured.
The sample covers three payment windows:
1) Within 5 days
2) Between 6 and 60 days
3) After 60 days
The average fine increases from approximately €60 in the first payment window to €79 in the second, and €211 in the third, reaching more than three and a half times the initial amount. Payment behaviour follows the opposite pattern: on average, 71% of payments are made within the first five days, 26% between the sixth and sixtieth day, and only 3% after that period. Across approximately one quarter of the operators in the sample, no voluntary payments are recorded once the sixty-day threshold has passed. As the cost increases, the share of payments falls sharply: those who intend to pay generally do so immediately, while those who postpone payment, in the vast majority of cases, never pay at all.
That this behaviour is driven by the price differential—rather than simply by the diligence of those receiving the fine—is suggested by an internal comparison within the sample. Some operators do not increase the amount after the first five days, keeping the same fine throughout the entire sixty-day period. In these cases, payment behaviour is markedly different: 41% of payments are made within the first five days, compared with 54% during the following fifty-five days. The absence of an early price increase therefore appears to reduce the incentive for prompt payment. Without a financial advantage to paying early, payments are spread much more evenly over time, confirming that it is the presence of the first pricing "step" that concentrates payments in the initial days.
Conclusion
The conclusion may seem paradoxical: the surcharge works precisely because almost no one ends up paying it. Its value lies not in the additional revenue—which is marginal by definition—but in the incentive it creates. By making delay economically irrational, it concentrates payments in the period when collection is simplest and least costly, before reminders, enforcement orders, and legal recovery procedures become necessary. In other words, a significantly higher cost for late payment acts as an effective deterrent against both procrastination and non-payment.
For public transport operators, this leads to a clear operational implication: the key lever is not the base amount of the fine, but the design of the penalty tiers. An early and clearly noticeable increase, communicated effectively on the notice and supported by immediate payment channels, shifts the majority of payments into the first few days, when receivables are both more valuable and less expensive to collect. Beyond sixty days, the data leave little room for doubt: the opportunity for voluntary payment has effectively disappeared.
